The True Narcissists

Ethnic violence ravages Osh in the south of Kyrgyzstan.  Placed in the crux of the national gerrymandering of ethnicities by the USSR is opening the Russian in Central Asia.  Osh is far enough away from its bases as to warrant the relatively cool response.

But what the hell is going on in Kyrgyzstan?  As far as what can be gleaned is the resistance of loyalists to the ousted former leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev has begun a campaign to challenge the interim leader Rosa Otunbayeva.

I am a little underwhelmed by this stratagem.  For Bakiyev supporters the focus on the minority Uzbek population so close to the boarder is bound to require reaction and support from the other states in the region.  Though Russia, as of now, have taken under advisement Otunbayeva’s calls for international assistance the situation will only rally international support facilitating the end to the violence.

Another point being that the machinations of Bakiyaev supporters have opened a window for Russia to gain a further foothold in the tiny nation.  By fermenting unrest the pressure of this on a declared interim government will test the loyalties of the political and military classes to each other.  If this risks a power struggle, then Russian leaders can have their choice on whom to support.

Russia appeared to welcome the change of leadership, but has let Bakiyev lumber around its ally Belarus since his ouster.

If continued low level violence is the norm Russia will feel this situation out and will present Otunbayeva with the following options: either let us in or we won’t help.

Russia has desired more sway in the former USSR member and the ability to come to the rescue of a fledgling government will allow Russia the functional connection to the power-brokers to exert influence to tip the US out of Kyrgyzstan eventually.

For Russia, the opportunity has presented a strategic opening for the expanding power over its regional domain.  The question is the US being outplayed?

The world of diplomatic language is a nuanced and specific world, where word choice is paramount and reasoning is open-ended and flexible.  This makes reading such documents of slipperiness as frustrating as grasping for handfuls of air.  To help clarify this murky world I present this continuing segment of “Decoded”

Article here.

It begins:

Fresh sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council against Iran on Wednesday should actually be viewed as another chance for further diplomatic effort to break the nuclear impasse through peaceful solutions acceptable to all parties.

The Chinese leadership publicly believes this.  For the Iranian diplomatic response we can summarize the basic reactions as “rubbish,” a promise for “a reevaluation of the relationship to the IAEA,” the sanctions are “political, illogical, and illegal.”  Basic Iranian reactions from the belligerence we’ve come to adore in the Ahmadinejad regime.  Still, it is not unfeasible for Iran, or any state for that matter, to say one thing and act differently.  In the end this seems to be simply moving along the slow detachment of Iran from international oversight.

Next:

The current UN resolution reflects the concerns of the international community over Iran’s purpose in developing its nuclear program. It aims to push Tehran to undertake active measures that will fulfill its obligations regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The talk of Iran leaving the NPT is always in the air, but without provocation it seems unlikely in the short-term.

Moving on:

However, sanctions can never fundamentally solve the international standoff over the nuclear issue. The sanctions do not necessarily mean diplomatic effort will be a closed door. It should, instead, activate another round of diplomatic dialogue to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table.

See above.

A little out of order:

Iranian citizens should not bear the brunt of the sanctions and normal business exchanges with other nations should not get affected either.

This statement reflects the desires of the Chinese government to ensure the “mostly” free flow of petroleum stuffs out of and in to Iran; evidenced by the lack of sanctions on the petroleum industry.  The timing is precious if you agree with the view that stiff sanctions that affected the daily lives of Iranians with regards to the petroleum industry would be attributed to the current hard-line regime, which would strengthen the reformist “green” movement.  Chinese officials receive boatloads (teehee) of oil from Iran and are not interested in sacrificing their driving energy demands on the Green Movement.  Further, this conforms to the non-interventionist image crafted by the Chinese foreign policy officials.

Last part:

China is always committed to a dual track approach in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. While insisting that any UN resolution should contribute to the international non-proliferation regime, it has repeatedly stressed that the action be conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East and that it guarantees Iran’s right for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

What does “peace and stability” mean in this context?

Read on…

All these principles have guided China’s participation in the consultations on imposing sanctions against Iran. China hopes Iran would take concrete steps to convince the international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the issue of Israel’s nuclear capabilities was brought up for the first time in 19 years at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, which began in Vienna on Monday.  The highlighting of this issue could be yet another important step in the region’s de-nuclearization process.

There we have it.  Stability is brought into context within the regional consideration of the Iran/Israel divide.  What we can see from this is a major strategic coup for the Iranian-Chinese relationship.  China ultimately can sympathize with the Iranian desire for regional-power status.  By mentioning Israeli nuclear armament the argument goes like this: how is Iran supposed to act when Israel operates outside the very system that Iran adheres to so poorly; at least we aren’t cowering behind the hegemon.  Further, China has tied the stability portion of the argument to a balancing concept: if Israel has them then Iran naturally desires a deterrent.  What is difficult is that it places the issue of Israeli disarmament as the quid pro quo for Iranian disarmament.

Many whom I have spoken with regarding this issue agree about the relative hypocrisy of Israeli nukes, but if the US has trouble getting Israel to lift a little sea embargo just imagine the difficulty in getting them to give up their nukes or join the NPT.

The recent flotilla debacle off the Gaza coast has highlighted a significant issue regarding the ability of the Palestinian territories to conduct any feasible economic development.  Of course, the ability to trade freely is significantly hindered by the numerous restrictions placed around both territories by Israel.  The argument for the restrictions is that the extremist Palestinian groups will use this freedom to arm themselves freely.

This argument does hold water.  As situations in the past have shown that when violence erupts in the region neither side shy’s away from using its arms to ensure its ends.  This is furthered by the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon; where if a rearmed Hamas coordinated a two front resistance to Israel it would be a situation fraught with consequences.  Yet, if Israel is planning on committing to the two-state solution then the expected ability of the Palestinian territories to engage in free commerce would also be expected.

The point is that Palestine will probably not be able to secure any real economic gains in the coming years as the situation continues to deteriorate.  In fact, the Palestinian economy peaked in 1999; just before the Second Intifada.  Since, the restrictions have accumulated with the election of Hamas, the war with Hezbollah, and the election of Netanyahu.  These restrictions have crippled any notion of the “market” from operating in a meaningful and legal way that could spur long term investment.

The situation is perilous for the cyclical nature of the behavior has left no room for compromise and little trust necessary for future long term development.  In the balance between Israel’s security needs and the Palestinian economy the outcome is predictable.

The point of this little post has been to ask whether the two-state solution is even possible under the current economic climate.  If any meaningful steps are to be made towards the two state solution then the economic question will have to be addressed.  If the limitations of commerce are to be lifted then Israel will need to trust that the freedom to conduct economic relations will not result in increasing the business of war-making.

In the end the two-state solution remains a pie in the sky notion for a format where concessions on grand scale may be exchanged in the hopes of relieving the stalemate of Palestinian sovereignty.  Such a measure would require the ability to gain something from both sides that is in drastically short supply: trust.

Yet, the first step towards this would be to allow the Palestinians the ability to conduct business and secure a belief in the attainment of stable economic development.  As long as this issue is tied to Israeli security the possibility of any agreement in a long shot.

The “A” through “D” collection.

A collection of political and military “definitions” from Gustave Flaubert.  From the collection entitled “The Dictionary of Accepted Ideas” comes a satirical work that mocks what was termed as, “the ideas that ferment in the brains of the brainless.”  Please enjoy these for the wit and revelation that political perceptions are subject to comparison across time; note, Flaubert died in 1880…

America. A famous example of injustice: Columbus discovered it and it is named after Amerigo Vespucci.  Exalt it all the same, especially if you’ve never been there.  Lecture people on self government.

Aristocracy. Despise and envy it.

Army. The bulwark of society.

Assassin. Always a coward, even if he acted with daring and courage.

Bankers. All millionaires.  Levantines.  Wolves.

Battle.  Always “Bloody.”  There are always two sets of victors: those who won and those who lost.

Budget.  Never Balanced.

Bureaucrat.  Inspires awe, no matter what bureau he works in.

Cavalry.  Nobler than the infantry.

Chess. Symbol of military tactics.  All great generals good at chess.  Too serious a game, too pointless as a science.

Competition.  The soul of trade.

Compromise. Always recommend it, even when the alternatives are irreconcilable.

Conservative. Politician with a pot belly.  “A limited conservative mind?  Certainly!  Limits keep fools from falling down wells.”

Constitutional. Are stifling us-under them it is impossible to govern.

Diplomacy. A distinguished career, but beset with difficulties and full of mystery.  Suited only for aristocrats.  a profession of vague import, though higher than trade.  Diplomats are invariably subtle and shrewd.

Document. Invariably, “of the highest importance.”

I composed this to respond to Abu’s question:

Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies? If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear? What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations? And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in Central Asia – and how do you propose to secure them?

My response:

The war in Afghanistan is necessary to destroy the remaining al Qaeda targets in the FATA region of Pakistan.  This was the main purpose for invading Afghanistan and should remain our first priority.  By engaging the Taliban elements, who support al Qaeda, we apply pressure to the movement that continues in its desire to spread its vision of an Islamist society.  Our current strategic thinking is that the presence of the Taliban in any region outside the FATA is unacceptable to the security of the US because of their connection to al Qaeda.  If the US can make modest gains in stabilizing a systematic governing cycle of loose federalism in Afghanistan and pacifying support for the Taliban in the population then succeeding in our goal of denying a safe haven to terrorists improves dramatically.

But is all this really necessary?  What if we negotiated the surrendering of al Qaeda leadership with the Taliban?

This should take us back to the immediate post 9-11 months when we could have offered a little more to the Taliban than the choice of open and humiliating capitulation or complete destruction.  During this time we viewed the Taliban as brutal oppressors that stood against all our Western ideals.  To the US the Taliban established exactly the kind of society bin Laden sought to establish, and delivering freedom seemed like a glorious two-for-one.

Now, that we are faced with the price tag of this freedom nine years later the taste in our mouths is becoming unpalatable.  It seems that we now face more problems in Afghanistan than we did during October 2001.  The survival of bin Laden and Zawahiri, a flourishing drug trade, Taliban clashes with the Pakistani government, and the poor performance of centralized leadership in Kabul are all now our problems.  The strategic logic of our current COIN policy says that we must keep pushing deeper into the society in order to stabilize so that we can turn control over to trusted Afghan allies that will preserve the status quo we establish.

This is so because we believe that any incarnation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is simply not an option.  If this is the ultimate goal then the US must be ready for at least a fifteen year military commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars in aid over the next twenty five.  I place such high numbers because I see true political change as the function of generational replacement than, say, purchased inducements.

That being said, I am afraid that Bacevich is right in that there is a cheaper way of accomplishing this; one that does not seek to dramatically alter the political society of Afghanistan.  This requires our purchasing the support of the local leaders and dealing harshly with those who harbor elements of al Qaeda.  The role of the US military in Afghanistan would be one of training and supplying Afghan allies, regulating misfits and disturbances, providing local security for development, reducing the opium trade, and staging for attacks against al Qaeda.

This plan does away with notions of establishing our dreams for a westernized Afghan state by accepting the brutality of the Afghan political culture, accepting the patriarchal nature of Afghan society, and perhaps accepting the reality of the Taliban’s existence as a force with political resonance in Afghan society.  This will require acting with a cold precision about what we must do to achieve denying al Qaeda a foothold in Afghanistan.

Fresh from the presses is a supposed compromise on health care reform.  The op-ed from Senators Wyden and Bennett offers us these gems:

1. “…everyone — not just those who currently get insurance through their employer — would get a generous standard deduction that they would use to buy insurance — and keep the excess if they buy a less expensive policy.”

A “generous” tax rebate?  I find these tax rebate notions slightly ridiculous.  If it was that imperative that we have the money to purchase insurance then why do we have to first hand it over to the government.  The reason is thus:

2. “The Republicans agreed to require all individuals to have coverage and to provide subsidies where necessary to ensure that everyone can afford it.”

The government can dictate when to give you this deduction by penalizing those who “choose” not to be insured.  Also, the tax collection to redistribute this money must accompany some kind of tax increase or lead to further deficit spending. Also, this seems to echo the notion of your tax dollars going directly to the insurance companies with you getting the remainder of your “generous” deduction.

3. “Our plan would give the consumer the same leverage in the health-care marketplace by creating state-run insurance exchanges through which they can select plans, including their existing employer-sponsored plan.”

I am not sure how I.E.’s lower prices (see Massachusetts), but the notion that we provide a “generous” allotment for a health care plan seems to direct more dollars to state based markets.  Further, the increase in demand for plans should send the prices of plans up.  Still, this seems like government sponsored price setting.   For example, the insurance companies know that a certain percentage of people are buckling to the mandated insurance provision and can predict how much a group will be paid.  Thus, the directors of distribution on the state level set prices by simply allotting money; the individual exerts no leverage, the bureaucracy that levels the tax deduction does.

Further, this compromise does not solve the notion of higher costs due to the illegal immigrants effect on the hospital system.  If the basis for this plan is to be specifically state run from a federal dispensary then states with higher illegal populations will continue to suffer with localized budget drains.

In effect, this bill appears the first on the bi-partisan butcher block, choked with handouts to the insurance companies with no notion of regulating the rising cost of health care.  Further, by denying the government to act as an honest broker in negotiating prices across the board the money we provide them carries no incentives when delivered to the insurance companies.  The reason is because insurance companies know that they are getting your money.

All I can see is that we would have government subsidised status quo health care.

As health care reform seems to be spiraling towards some kind of a conclusion as the August recess of congress approaches the plethora of plans in contention seems to obscure any fortune telling as to what exactly is going to be the result of all this compromise.  While the so-called Blue Dog Dems seem to be gumming up the works for any substantial reform the average person will have very little input on this upcoming bill.  While  special interests push to preserve or favorably manipulate what makes the current and future system profitable.

But I understand that most Americans will wake up some day and learn about this health care reform and then make the best decision for themselves.  Despite the average Americans political ideologies (either right, left or centrist) the notion that they specifically grasp the nuances between a mixed market vs. two-tier systems is ludicrous.

You are also confronted by the ideological leanings of the populous.  Certain people will never be open to a public option because of the deep-seeded belief that this infringes on the liberty of the people.  Whats more is that they would continue to hold this belief even if the public option was successful.

Now that we are faced with the summer break of our Congress, health care reform waits in the shadows of back room  deals and compromised quid pro quo.  But not to worry, that’s the way its always been.

President Obama’s position has focused on repeatedly calling for the need and importance of reforming one-seventh of our economy and practically declaring that it must be delivered.  Also, he has said that it must be fiscally neutral; not adding any more deficit spending (in the long term at least).

But what about the Prescription Drug Plan that President Bush signed over that denied Medicare the ability to negotiate with these companies.  Essentially, this denies the ability of the government to establish itself as a “public option” competition, while costing the public millions in over-priced drug subsidies.

Will the new health care bill be so hindered by “bi-partisan” compromise that it fails to effectively provide a public option?

What I find even more troubling is that will the bill be signed if it meets the broad targets laid out by Obama himself, but does not go far enough to truly provide us with an effective public option?

Has the President over-committed to the point where he will be faced with the option of vetoing a defective bill and suffering the loss of face by being viewed as unable to deliver on compromise?  Or signing weak legislation in the hope that at least its something (i.e. see Stimulus Bill).

Two recent articles by John Bolton and Max Boot have come to the conclusion that now would be the opportune moment for Israel to strike Iranian nuclear sites.  Essentially, Bolton states that Iran is continuing its “delay negotiations to buy time” strategy to develop nuclear weapons capability.  Further, diplomacy is a loser option that will not reverse this inevitability of a nuclear Iran.  Ok, nothing new, but what is disturbing is WHY Bolton thinks this is the best time for Israel, not the US, to strike Iran.

Bolton highlights the recent post-electoral conflicts in Iran, “makes it more likely that an effective public diplomacy campaign could be waged in the country to explain to Iranians that such an attack is directed against the regime, not against the Iranian people.”

This seems like typical Bush-era logic of the “greet us as liberators” simplicity that must be too good to be true.  How would such a campaign work?  How long would it take?  The logic is painfully light on the lynchpin of the argument: that public diplomacy would alter perceptions of Iranians to see the favorability in Jewish planes bombing their nation with near impunity.

Exactly how would this come about?  Such a campaign, which would have the people being bombed identifying and supporting those doing the bombing, is the stuff of dreams.

If John Bolton to going to make the argument that (1) the militarization of the Iranian nuclear program is simply not tolerable.  (2) That the only feasible way to prevent this is by military strike.  And (3) that the overwhelming US power makes any confrontation heavily balanced to the US’s favor.  That is a position you can get behind.  But to suggest that we can prod Israel into doing our dirty work, and then have a majority of Iranians thank us has Bolton bordering on the megalomaniacal.

Again, this is not to say that the position of military solutions to difficult foreign policy options is not valid, but that delusions of its effect on the target nation is a familiar failure for the senior members of the Bush era that has not lost its appeal.

Esteemed Harvard historian Niall Ferguson recently penned an article titled “The Axis of Upheaval” that points to the potential burgeoning hot-spots for international conflict that will face President Obama. On this list is Russia, Somalia, Mexico, Iran, Lebanon, Israel/Gaza, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India with contenders Indonesia, Turkey and Thailand as well as about 60% of sub-Sahara Africa.

Certainly an impressive list to be sure. Ferguson sees this time as especially ignitable due to the recent economic downturn that will cause further disruptions to these fledgling middle world economies. With this downturn will follow domestic political upheavals along with the potential in a few cases for inter-state war as well.  The case for this seems plausible due the globalized nature of interconnectedness for larger international conflicts that develop from state collapse.

The last severe structural economic shock with such a political dimension on the global level was perhaps the Oil Shock of 1973. The following years saw the start of several conflicts that would continue to tragic proportions: Angolan Civil War, Ethiopian Civil War, and the Lebanese Civil War. Further, nations severely hit by the crisis and subsequent downturn faced pivotal changes that continue to have international implications. Iran and Pakistan fit these categories.

But which of these nations would pose the biggest threat to the US if the political systems of these nations fall into violent and disruptive patterns. Though this is purely hypothetical, the list is compiled to reflect the possibility of direct US involvement.

1. Pakistan collapse, Indian invasion. This seems to me to be the most possible of these, and the most potentially disrupting to world order. Not only are the nuclear weapons and large populations the fodder for this scenario, but also the presence of Russia, China, and the US in the region place the conflict at a geopolitical center of potential major power disruptions.
2. Mexican collapse, US response. If Mexico falls into complete disarray then be prepared for a swift response from US officials to preserve order. The potential for millions of refugees flooding into the southwest states makes its case for number two simply in its proximity to the US. Apart from the conservative nightmare this would impart on poor Pat Buchanan, the US would face serious challenges mitigating a failed Mexican state.
3. Afghan collapse. This unpleasant possibility would severely damage the US world standing and reflect its impotence to bend the will of foreign peoples. Also, the process of this collapse would drag on for endless years, with the potential for a two-generation war. Such an occurrence would be devastating to the US.
4. Iran goes nuclear, shuns US pressure. While this is an unpleasant possibility it is by no means the outright disaster. This defeat is more psychological for the US than a real geopolitical disasters of the previously mentioned. In practical terms, the US capability and lack of reliable allies for Iran may provide enough of a deterrent to keep Iran in check for many decades to come. The wild card in all of this is the Israeli reaction.
5. Russia and the next eventual clash with the former soviet bloc. While the expansionist goals of our old Cold War buddy are never far away from the policy makers who cut their teeth in the previous generations, a serious victory for Russia in these areas could range from mild (Georgia or Moldova) to down right alarming (Belarus or Ukraine). Though the zero-sum reasoning of the Cold War might be over the limits of tolerating Russian aggression have not seen the boldest of responses from the US leaders.
6. Israel/Gaza and Hezbollah create regional disharmony. The continual flares of the conflict in Israel remain the most likely of these to flare, but I am not convinced that the implications of this are not that great on a macro scale. It seems that the major danger comes with the injection of further regional meddling, most likely from Syria, but for the time being it appears the region will continue along its familiar path. Though the conflict is the cause of much disharmony during the frequent spats, that is usually all they lead too; contained little outrages that repeal meaningful international action better than piracy. Which leads me too…
7. Somalia falling further. Perhaps it is just me, but this issue deserves to be at the bottom of the list. The media attention this story has garnered is impressive, but I am tired already of the “shores of Tripoli” references for action that the US will not commit to because the problem is relatively small potatoes. Also, lets temper the terrorist label for these high sea entrepreneurs before the facts are in; it seems more likely that these are criminal profiteers in it for the potential for easy money and not al Qaeda 3.0.

It has been a busy few months since i last picked up the keyboard, and (true to form) i return with for an analysis of the upcoming ‘Obama Doctrine’ for Afghanistan.

Somewhat leaked by Reuters this week was an article that highlights the recent shift in the US strategy towards Afghanistan.  Overall, the big picture for the conception of this strategy is based on the concept of “narrowing.”  There is a marked deviation from the rhetorical and ideological foundation of the Bush Administration vision for Iraq, Afghanistan and the essential assumptions about foreign policy.  What may be said in general is that the new strategy will “lower expectations” to the unattainable goals of the heavily rhetorisized Bush policy.  Lofty notions of setting people free all over the world through the power of democracy sounds nice, but the realization of such a goal in eight short years, by force if necessary, is practically unreasonable.

So it is thus that the president will provide some “reality” to the situation and intends to talk soberly about what is available to accomplish in Afghanistan.  By the end we may find that the Afghanistan we leave behind will simply be “free enough.”

Apart from the philosophical goals of this problem Obama has placed specific emphasis on preventing terrorist organizations from operating efficiently from Afghanistan or Pakistan.  To accomplish this Obama is recommitting America to developing the economy of Afghanistan through a localized strategy to improve human security.  Not only increasing the troop levels (a step already taken in February this year), but also training more indigenous capability to share the load.  With all of this in place it appears that Obama has decided to make Afghanistan his priority in his first term.  It is an ambitious challenge for the politician often chided during the campaign as naive and inexperienced, we should all hope then, that he is a fast learner.

I will be posting on all relevant details as the new strategy is revealed over the next week…i promise.