The True Narcissists

I composed this to respond to Abu’s question:

Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies? If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear? What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations? And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in Central Asia – and how do you propose to secure them?

My response:

The war in Afghanistan is necessary to destroy the remaining al Qaeda targets in the FATA region of Pakistan.  This was the main purpose for invading Afghanistan and should remain our first priority.  By engaging the Taliban elements, who support al Qaeda, we apply pressure to the movement that continues in its desire to spread its vision of an Islamist society.  Our current strategic thinking is that the presence of the Taliban in any region outside the FATA is unacceptable to the security of the US because of their connection to al Qaeda.  If the US can make modest gains in stabilizing a systematic governing cycle of loose federalism in Afghanistan and pacifying support for the Taliban in the population then succeeding in our goal of denying a safe haven to terrorists improves dramatically.

But is all this really necessary?  What if we negotiated the surrendering of al Qaeda leadership with the Taliban?

This should take us back to the immediate post 9-11 months when we could have offered a little more to the Taliban than the choice of open and humiliating capitulation or complete destruction.  During this time we viewed the Taliban as brutal oppressors that stood against all our Western ideals.  To the US the Taliban established exactly the kind of society bin Laden sought to establish, and delivering freedom seemed like a glorious two-for-one.

Now, that we are faced with the price tag of this freedom nine years later the taste in our mouths is becoming unpalatable.  It seems that we now face more problems in Afghanistan than we did during October 2001.  The survival of bin Laden and Zawahiri, a flourishing drug trade, Taliban clashes with the Pakistani government, and the poor performance of centralized leadership in Kabul are all now our problems.  The strategic logic of our current COIN policy says that we must keep pushing deeper into the society in order to stabilize so that we can turn control over to trusted Afghan allies that will preserve the status quo we establish.

This is so because we believe that any incarnation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is simply not an option.  If this is the ultimate goal then the US must be ready for at least a fifteen year military commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars in aid over the next twenty five.  I place such high numbers because I see true political change as the function of generational replacement than, say, purchased inducements.

That being said, I am afraid that Bacevich is right in that there is a cheaper way of accomplishing this; one that does not seek to dramatically alter the political society of Afghanistan.  This requires our purchasing the support of the local leaders and dealing harshly with those who harbor elements of al Qaeda.  The role of the US military in Afghanistan would be one of training and supplying Afghan allies, regulating misfits and disturbances, providing local security for development, reducing the opium trade, and staging for attacks against al Qaeda.

This plan does away with notions of establishing our dreams for a westernized Afghan state by accepting the brutality of the Afghan political culture, accepting the patriarchal nature of Afghan society, and perhaps accepting the reality of the Taliban’s existence as a force with political resonance in Afghan society.  This will require acting with a cold precision about what we must do to achieve denying al Qaeda a foothold in Afghanistan.