The True Narcissists

On his first day of office President Barack Obama signed the order to close Guantanamo Bay “no later than a year from today.” Further, President Obama signed orders ending the interrogation policies of the Bush Administration, closing of the CIA secret prison system and requiring a review of all cases of the prisoners of Guantanamo.

The president cited the belief he had expressed on the campaign trail that the betrayal of our democratic principles will make the US less-safe in the long term. Opponents of this view call the president naive.

This “conservative” objection is most often expressed through the extremist voices of the right wing radio (RWR) propaganda machine. When faced with a question regarding Guantanamo the host will often slip into a diatribe condemning Bush for not expanding the system and furthering the distance between what is for “Americans” and what is for “terrorists.”

The rest of America (I believe) realize that the issues involved with keeping and disposing of the Guantanamo system are of no small importance. Regardless, the decision has been made to destroy the system; the question must be returned to what are we to create to replace it.

Just make it up as we go along…

Recent criticisms of President Obama’s decision have focused on his lack of a coherent plan to replace the prison, establish a system of courts to prosecute, or indicate the procedures for interrogation of new prisoners during the Obama administration. “It’s like he is going to make it all up as he goes along; I ask, is that responsible? Will this make us safer?” This lament of a “conservative” host was used to damn the recent decisions of the 44^th president, but it could equally be used to damn his predecessor.

Such short memories fail to grasp the absolute reversal from contemporary American policy towards terrorism that the Bush Administration enacted after 9/11 (chronicled here). The coming to light of just how the Bush Administration dealt with the legal ramifications (here) of the new way that the GWOT entailed designing unilateral policies that struggled against the international nature of the 21^st century; in a new age, they were establishing older sovereignty based arguments.

What is this all really about?

As far as I can tell this is the case for a Guantanamo system:

- the GWOT is a new kind of war

- the members of terrorist organizations are not traditional soldiers and are not subject to established treaties for prosecuting them as civilians or soldiers.

- because of this new “third way” the prisoners are not subject to American justice.

- the terrorists are judged to be guilty without the need of a trail

- anyone deemed in this category do not deserve the benefits of American Justice.

- American security is paramount, and trumps all considerations beyond this immediate calculation.

The other side

- the GWOT is a fabrication, the world is essentially the same

- it was wrong to deviate so drastically from the established manner for bringing terrorists to justice.

- international prisoners should be held to international standards of justice

- trails should be established in the tradition of the rule of law, and have a multilateral dimension.

- judging terrorists without the benefits of the American system taints any concept of “justice”

- American security is best served by leading the world through our integrity abroad by not failing victim to the desire to create an “us vs. them” concept of justice.

- that some immediate risks to our security is worth our national integrity remaining intact.

It’s about damn time…

President Obama made good on a promise to end the unilateral desecration of the American standing of the world because he understands that perhaps our greatest asset in the world is our being that “shining city on a hill.” But how could we become this if we condone torture, operate as if we have no stake in the international arena, and betray our own political freedoms for those around the world. How could we look to the rest of the world and demand that we have the right to unilaterally undertake any action and then not uphold our conduct to the measure of our own citizenry?

The new security is one where we, as Americans, realize that we are not alone in this desire for freedom and extend this luxury as our olive branch to the world. If our hand is bitten in the process then we know for sure who our enemies are, rather than treating everyone as such based solely on our prerogatives.

As the final days of the Bush Administration come to a close any responsible blogger of politics must lend their voice to the litany of of report cards and assessments of a controversial president. Each section will highlight the views of two broad groups of ideological currents of thinking on American politics, followed by a comment about why ultimate judgment remains difficult. I, your humble narrator, am not perfectly immune to my own judgments about these policies, but I will try to elaborate the complexity of the issues that faced our 43^rd leader of the executive branch.

9-11

It is my view that this president was completely entranced by this national tragedy for the majority of his presidency. So deep was his belief that his god had placed him here to face this challenge that his hubris was navigated and manipulated by the black and white view of the world on a micro and macro scale. The challenge thrust upon Bush by a small group of revolutionaries in Afghanistan was pursued with such passion that a broader view of the worlds problems were neglected. The majority of Americans were just as spellbound, and continue to be so, by the audacious actions of al Qaeda, and therefore share in this specific delusion that, “there was a before 9-11, and then there is an after 9-11.”

The Global War on Terror (GWOT)

The necessity to combat this perception of international politics led the US to declare a policy so broad in its scope and so vague in its definition of victory as to be totally malleable to the machinations of political necessity as Bush saw fit. Anywhere, at any time the GWOT could be held as justification for all acts and policies initiated as necessary for the protection of the homeland.

Specifically, the beginnings of the GWOT is the invasion of Afghanistan. Remarkable for its early successes that developed into the further failures of:

-Guantanamo Bay

-neglect of Afghanistan as Iraq came to the forefront

-failure to control opium production

-failure to capture bin Laden

Indeed, as Iraq would prove later the Bush Administration excelled at invading and defeating enemies militarily, but lacked the ability to efficiently secure political and social successes. Those that favor the Presidency of G. W. Bush applaud his record of no other attacks on the homeland as the crowning achievement of the GWOT. This fact leads to one of the most challenging facets of the GWOT.

Taking the Fight to Them

Though the US homeland remained attack free since 9-11, the rest of the world has not been so alleviated from terrorism. By all accounts the period of time during the GWOT has seen record numbers of terrorist attacks throughout the world. A majority of these being concentrated in Iraq, and throughout the Muslim world.

The paradox is thus: has our supposed safety come at the cost of those around the world? The notion of relocating the battlefield of terrorism from the homeland to the countries of our direct involvement has not exactly improved the ultimate security goal of the GWOT for the global picture. The logic seems to suggest that it is better for al Qaeda to attack our troops and societies abroad as a strategic necessity for our safety at home. The cynicism of this policy is not easy to accept, but ultimately it is indeed better for others to suffer for our benefit. Are we as Americans comfortable saying that the 90,000 Iraqis killed since the invasion is acceptable for our safety?

This is not to say that G. W. Bush has blood on his hands, but his policies did lead to these paradoxical outcomes.

Shortly after part I was published a story circulated about President Elect Obama’s stance on Guantanamo and torture.  When asked if voters could find successes in the first two years he responded,

“On foreign policy, have we closed down Guantanamo in a responsible way, put a clear end to torture and restored a balance between the demands of our security and our constitution?”

Further, in true political fashion Obama sought a “deadline” for the destruction of the Guantanamo system.  This lofty goal would signal an end to the “War on Terror” as we have come to realize its ever present existence.  The desire for the closure of Guantanamo will require facing difficult decisions about how to further combat the threat of transnational terror organizations in a matter that obliges is executors to the US constitution.  The essential issue is tied to the understanding of rights, and how these are upheld in an increasingly international world.  To be sure, this is no easy task; as the closure of Guantanamo requires a restructuring of the legal and operational precedents of the Bush Administration.

You can’t ignore the past…

It appeared that the Bush Administration seemed perfectly willing to forgo any meaningful decision about what to do with the regular detainee in Guantanamo.  Sensing that the checks and balance system of the US would take years to reach any meaningful decision about the legality of these “enemy combatants” the Bush Administration sought to continue defending its position on the legal stance of the Administration.  It was the Justice Department that lost its Supreme Court decision in the summer of 2008 requiring the detainees receive the rights accorded to all people incarcerated by the government.  The ruling only stated that the current system of holding prisoners is unconstitutional; it said nothing about how to deal with the prisoners.  In the past months the Administration has cleared around 60 inmates of Guantanamo for release; through what process in a legal sense it is unknown.  As it turns out this course of action is proving difficult when trying to to figure where these five dozen former “enemy combatants” should live.

Will no one take our dirty laundry?

Recently, Australia rejected a request to accept a detainee from Guantanamo.  The US is now faced with the dilemma of being legally bound from releasing the detainees to nations who will prosecute or possibly torture the former inmates.  Recent Bush Administration requests for other European nations to accept released detainees have fallen flat, but with the incoming Obama some Europeans nations are reconsidering.  Though no official positions have been made it should prove interesting to see which leaders are willing to work with Obama on an issue that was rejected under Bush.

A recent VOA article By Al Pessin finds that there are three types of detainees: those who are cleared for release, but no one will take them, those charged with specific crimes, and those who are considered too dangerous to release, but who are incapable of being prosecuted.  This last category reflects the specific manner that the US instituted after 9/11 to handle the “war on terror.”

The traditional approach to terrorism in the legal stance was to treat the cases as criminal acts which must be brought to justice.  The first WTC, Oklahoma City, and USS Cole bombings were all handled in this manner.  Yet, after 9/11 Bush decided that conventional justice would not be enough, and Americans filled with righteous vengeance bought this position without question.  In this climate the Bush Administration displayed its common error in the lack of long term thinking by failing to figure out a process to prosecute those al Qaeda suspects across the world.  Seeking flexibility and typical unilateral control Bush chose the legal no-mans-land of the Guantanamo system for imprisoning all suspects.  Now, seven years later, the mechanisms of the American system have forced the issue of finally figuring out what to do with some 250 men you can neither just kill nor release.

A new kind of court.

Because of the actions in the post 9/11 cleanup of Afghanistan the Bush Administration clearly rejected the conventional approach of bringing to trail these men under the normal means of American Justice.  Today, these cases would not proceed beyond the basic legal parameters of our understanding of justice.  What is now being suggested is a new “National Security Court” that would exist beyond even the shakiest of fast-moving military tribunals conducted in a normal war time setting.  Writing for Slate.com Jack Goldsmith and Benjamin Wittes suggest that these courts could form a basis for a continuing separate sphere of justice that would handle civilian terrorist cases.  With this I foresee two major problems: first, are the standards for burden of proof specifically based on the methods of past detainee arrests, and second, who will be classified under this system?

There is a severe disconnect in basing a legal system on the Bush Administrations past detention policies because there was no serious effort in justifying detention beyond national security.  What Obama faces is the prospect of either having to create two separate courts for the pre and post Bush years, or establishing a court so lax in its burden of proof that it loses public confidence.  All of this must also be established and justified under our constitution.  Next will be to determine who exactly fits into this new system of justice.  Such a decision may further alienate US policy as continued unilateral justice in the American sense spreads international.

Obama has yet to signal what legal sense the Guantanamo issue will be solved.  In choosing, he will perhaps establish a new international system of American Justice; an issue that his predecessor failed to resolve.

It may appear premature to bring this subject up in only part two of the study, but it must be clear what exactly are the intentions of our actions for Afghanistan in a global strategy.  To be clear, what does “victory” look like in Afghanistan?  Ideally, the complete destruction of al-Qaeda through its support system, the Taliban.  The terrorist group formed the basis for the US invasion of Afghanistan; had the Taliban surrendered to US pressure and allowed the capture of Bin Laden we could have left the Taliban alone.  However, since the invasion has occurred the US now faces the reality of how Afghanistan and the War on Terror has progressed.  One of the lessons of 9/11 is supposed to be that the US can no longer afford to isolate nations and allow the lawlessness that permits our enemies to operate effectively.  The complications of the war in Iraq and the power gained by Taliban forces in Pakistan has developed into a geopolitical storm looming on the horizon with Afghanistan signaling the wind change.  In the course of finding what victory means in Afghanistan we shall have to examine several perspectives on how that victory is to be achieved.

How do we win?

During the campaign Obama emphasized the conflict in Afghanistan as being overlooked due to the situation in Iraq.  Further, he expressed that invading Iraq was based on a poor conception of how the War on Terror should be fought.  Yet, what Obama is faced with is essentially a nation-building situation in Afghanistan with similar parallels to the Iraqi situation (complex ethnic divisions, an intrusive and penetrating enemy to the east).  While there are broader similarities between Iraq and Afghanistan the internal dynamics and specific elements of the political equation are much different.  The incoming Obama Administration must come to terms with deciding upon what victory means in the war in Afghanistan because this will directly influence the way in which that victory is achieved.

Let’s get philosophical…

There appears to be two conceptions for the way to win in Afghanistan.  The first looks at the conflict as a battle between competing conceptions of freedom; in essence, a cultural battle of belief systems where victory means the assimilation of the Afghan people into the modern Western-style international structure.  The Taliban represent the antithesis of the liberal (philosophical, not leftist) conception of political existence, whose presence undermines the legitimacy of the US efforts to establish democracy in Afghanistan.  In this understanding victory requires the transformation of Afghan society into a replica of a western state where the people accept the legitimacy of the western model of freedom and dry up the support for the Islamic theocratic interpretation along the Taliban model.  This represents the ultimate in the “hearts and minds” or “soft power” victory for the US; the long term solution for stability that defeats al-Qaeda is the construction of a new and liberal Afghanistan.

Opposing this liberal paradigm is a view that stresses the military angle of the conflict, and rejects the notion that victory must be achieved through societal change.  Rather, we should engage the Afghan society along its own cultural terms and reject the notion that victory ultimately lies in our ability to win the people over to a western style of governance.  For this view, Michael Scheuer holds as a focused proponent.  We may label this as a “tribal” strategy because the focus is on perceiving the US strategy as a competitor in the domestic struggle for Afghan power.  Winning in Afghanistan requires the local leaders and communities identifying their long term interests with those of the US effort in removing the Taliban.  Accomplishing this requires a long term commitment in both the size and scope of military operations and the integration of the power of the US and Afghan forces.  Each victory by these forces increases the power and prestige of the US cause and emphasizes the perception that the right decision is for domestic leaders to side with the most powerful.  Thus, victory is the long term destruction of the Taliban’s base of support through a systematic socio-militaristic strategy where the US succeeds by empowering anti-Taliban leaders.

What we leave behind…

These two conceptions of victory for Afghanistan reflect two distinct conceptions of what we should be achieving, and what kind of Afghanistan we will eventually leave.  In the liberal view the US will seek to create a western style of society that will lead and influence the War on Terror as a cultural model of freedom for the other nations facing Islamic Extremism.  In the “tribal” model the US will leave behind an Afghanistan that resembles the historical traditions of the society that will stand as an example of US determination to defeat Islamic extremism.

It remains to be seen which side of this broad paradigm President Obama has decided upon.  The challenges facing the US in Afghanistan are great, but in determining what policy to implement in Afghanistan it is prudent to ask what kind of an Afghanistan will we end up creating.

This will be the first in a series of articles about the challenges in Afghanistan that will highlight the issues facing President Obama.  Each article will disseminate the issue and seek to provide a comprehensive understanding of how US and Afghan goals interact.  The issues will range from different elements of the challenges facing US policy makers in attempting to “win” the conflict in Afghanistan.  This first part will examine the multinational forces engaged in the fighting in Afghanistan.

Who is Running this Show?

As the situation stands now there are two separate military command structures for the US backed forces.  One is the continuation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that operates in the eastern and southern regions along the Afghan-Pakistan boarder led by CENTCOM commander General David Patraeus.  This force mainly consists of US military forces patrolling the region adjacent to the Taliban strongholds of Waziristan in western Pakistan and the Capitol of Kabul which is located some 100 miles from the boarder.  OEF consists mainly of establishing and maintaining security in the region so that construction and modernization of the region can progress.

The other command structure is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that is made up of a coalition of troops from US allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Though this is an international force, about 60% of the troops involved in the ISAF are from the US and Britain.  The overall command is led by a six month rotation of generals, of whom 4-star Army General David McKiernan is now is command.  The ISAF operate in the less volatile northern, western and southern regions of Afghanistan where the majority of non-US troops are concentrated.

Next, there is the Afghan National Army (ANA) which consists of some 80,000 troops.  These are US trained army personnel under the leadership of the Afghan Defense Minister General Abdul Rahim Wardak.  The official Afghan army was almost non-existent after the US invasion of October 2001.   The US led the effort to train and equip the ANA in order to hand off the execution of ground operations in the future.  The close supervision by the US training forces leads the experts to conclude that the ANA is relatively free of the corruption and infiltration faced by the Afghan police force.  Since 2005 the size of the ANA has tripled as the US faced a resurgent Taliban.  In effect, the US policy resembles the “vietnamization” policy whereby US forces train and equip local forces to operate under the scrutiny of advisers.

As for the enemy we may roughly divide the elements into two broad groups: the Taliban and Jihadists.  The Taliban are the exiled former rulers who were removed from power by the US invasion shortly after 9/11.  The group is still believed to be led by the one-eyed Mullah Mohammad Omar, though the limitations on the sophistication of the Taliban equipment imply that strict operational control is vested within local leaders and strongholds.  The second group are the Jihadists.  This group is a litany of radical Islamist groups who have answered the call of Jihad against the occupiers of Afghanistan.  The tactics of the jihadists are focused in terrorist attacks and general harassment of the international forces.  Though these two groups mutually engage for tactical purposes it would be a fallacy to lump the two groups together.  While the two groups are most strongly linked within the philosophical similarities of the jihad it is in the long term goals of the groups where the deviation persists.

Where are we now?

Over the past four years the Taliban forces have been gaining a stronger foothold of influence in Afghanistan.  The battle against the occupiers has developed into a war of attrition with neither side signaling for a political settlement that would end hostilities.  The message of the Taliban to the US  is simple: we will still be here when you leave.  It is a disturbing prospect for the battle weary American public that any kind of true “victory” in Afghanistan is a multi-generational exercise in nation building.  Yet, this appears to be the only way for Americans to achieve the stability desired for what we perceive as a victory; namely, to prevent the lawless rule where al-Qaeda may operate without impunity.  Taking into account of the long term prospects the focus must be on the international dimension of the conflict.

Indeed, the most complicated issue facing the US is having to cope with the diverse interplay of all the combatants.  There are severe drawbacks to the fighting a multiple force operation like Afghanistan where the goals are not expressly in military terms.  The ultimate “victory” in Afghanistan is not the outright elimination of an enemy, rather, it is in creating a situation where the enemy has no divisive and destructive goals against the status quo.  Also, apart from the difficulty in coordination, there exists the real possibility of a premature abandonment of the international community before US goals can be realized.  The challenges facing President Obama will be to convince the NATO and Afghan allies to fight a conflict that is unified in its strategy and acceptance of stated objectives.  It appears that the President’s message may have to be borrowed from an unfortunate source and become:  “stay the course.”

My compatriots and I have been basking since the election of Barack Obama, but as the financial world appears to be crashing in on us my mind has turned to what must be changed from the disaster that is the Bush Administration.  The first issue that springs to mind is the torture question.  Namely, will President Obama renounce all forms of torture that is aided by the US?  Will he cease coordinating with US allies that use torture?  When we investigate the recent history of US torture policy we find that Obama will be fighting an established policy tool that has, until recently, been operating under the consent of our political leaders.

Rendition: a Short History

Torture is illegal under US law.  Apparently, this means that it is illegal for any US citizen or soldier to engage in any form of torture on any human being.  Beginning in the early 1990′s, according to the ACLU, the CIA began shipping persons with intelligence value to countries like Jordan or Egypt for interrogation and torture in a process known as “extraordinary rendition.”  This program became organized and established under the Clinton Administration by a CIA employee named Micheal Scheuer.  Mr. Scheuer testified before congress that when a terrorist was apprehended by CIA operatives the US would manoeuvre around domestic restrictions on interrogation by placing suspects in countries where the human rights laws were easily negated.  Scheuer states that the claims of high level Clinton men insisting after 9/11 that these suspects being deported to other countries were being treated within the bounds of US law as a lie.

The Bush Administration on the 9/11 battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq reinterpreted US law to include in the toolbox of US interrogators many of the torture techniques available under the extraordinary rendition program. By removing the established international norms of the Geneva Conventions the Bush Administration placed the “enemy combatants” of the War on Terror in the international limbo of Guantanamo Bay and the rendition system.  The wide spread acceptance of torture in the interrogation process by the Bush Administration fermented an environment where Abu Ghraib style functioning flourished.  Using the fear of another 9/11 the Bush Administration justified torture as a necessary component of intelligence gathering for the protection of the homeland.  Under this system the extraordinary rendition practice sought to keep valued prisoners outside the bounds of US and international law by bouncing prisoners around the world to “black sites” in order to avoid Geneva Convention obligations.  Internally, the policy was labeled as “harsh interrogation” amounted to physical attacks, inflicting extreme environmental discomfort, and water boarding all operating under the approval of President Bush.

These policies are still considered standard operating procedure (SOP) for the Bush Administration’s War on Terror.

Obama and Change

The loss of US “soft power” over the torture question in the land of the free cannot be underestimated.  The ability to regain our credibility in the world must be answered by Obama in his next administration; to this date Obama has yet to address how he plans to deal with this problem.  During the campaign Obama said we must, “tell the world that America rejects torture without exception or equivocation. It’s time to stop telling the American people one thing in public while doing something else in the shadows.”  In doing so, Obama must take decisive action against the taints of the Bush Administration’s torture policy.  To say so when not burdened with protecting the American people is one thing, but bringing to life such a lofty ideal is another.  So, the question must be facing the President-elect: how do we fix this?

The simplest answer would simply be speech on an international forum that reestablished US commitment to the Geneva Conventions, followed by establishing executive orders for removing the Guantanamo system, rendition program, and the “harsh interrogation” limits.  Such a program of action would remove the practice of the US torture, but is this enough?  There is, perhaps, a more bold approach that could bring the mantra of change that Obama sought into a more dynamic form.

Simply put, a re-commitment to the Geneva Convention would imply that the international norms are simply at the whims of the current American administration.  If true change is what Obama seeks then perhaps his course should be to call for a new declaration of international rights by the nations of the world.  Such an action would seek to create a new international environment for human rights with the worlds greatest democracy leading the helm after renouncing its checkered past.  Obama could invoke his “team of rivals” concept by appointing John McCain to lead the US delegation in international negotiations.  In pure Obama fashion the appointment of his ultimate rival to this task would represent the unity of the American commitment to abolishing torture in all of its forms in a bold and sweeping fashion.