The True Narcissists

Ethnic violence ravages Osh in the south of Kyrgyzstan.  Placed in the crux of the national gerrymandering of ethnicities by the USSR is opening the Russian in Central Asia.  Osh is far enough away from its bases as to warrant the relatively cool response.

But what the hell is going on in Kyrgyzstan?  As far as what can be gleaned is the resistance of loyalists to the ousted former leader Kurmanbek Bakiyev has begun a campaign to challenge the interim leader Rosa Otunbayeva.

I am a little underwhelmed by this stratagem.  For Bakiyev supporters the focus on the minority Uzbek population so close to the boarder is bound to require reaction and support from the other states in the region.  Though Russia, as of now, have taken under advisement Otunbayeva’s calls for international assistance the situation will only rally international support facilitating the end to the violence.

Another point being that the machinations of Bakiyaev supporters have opened a window for Russia to gain a further foothold in the tiny nation.  By fermenting unrest the pressure of this on a declared interim government will test the loyalties of the political and military classes to each other.  If this risks a power struggle, then Russian leaders can have their choice on whom to support.

Russia appeared to welcome the change of leadership, but has let Bakiyev lumber around its ally Belarus since his ouster.

If continued low level violence is the norm Russia will feel this situation out and will present Otunbayeva with the following options: either let us in or we won’t help.

Russia has desired more sway in the former USSR member and the ability to come to the rescue of a fledgling government will allow Russia the functional connection to the power-brokers to exert influence to tip the US out of Kyrgyzstan eventually.

For Russia, the opportunity has presented a strategic opening for the expanding power over its regional domain.  The question is the US being outplayed?

The world of diplomatic language is a nuanced and specific world, where word choice is paramount and reasoning is open-ended and flexible.  This makes reading such documents of slipperiness as frustrating as grasping for handfuls of air.  To help clarify this murky world I present this continuing segment of “Decoded”

Article here.

It begins:

Fresh sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council against Iran on Wednesday should actually be viewed as another chance for further diplomatic effort to break the nuclear impasse through peaceful solutions acceptable to all parties.

The Chinese leadership publicly believes this.  For the Iranian diplomatic response we can summarize the basic reactions as “rubbish,” a promise for “a reevaluation of the relationship to the IAEA,” the sanctions are “political, illogical, and illegal.”  Basic Iranian reactions from the belligerence we’ve come to adore in the Ahmadinejad regime.  Still, it is not unfeasible for Iran, or any state for that matter, to say one thing and act differently.  In the end this seems to be simply moving along the slow detachment of Iran from international oversight.

Next:

The current UN resolution reflects the concerns of the international community over Iran’s purpose in developing its nuclear program. It aims to push Tehran to undertake active measures that will fulfill its obligations regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The talk of Iran leaving the NPT is always in the air, but without provocation it seems unlikely in the short-term.

Moving on:

However, sanctions can never fundamentally solve the international standoff over the nuclear issue. The sanctions do not necessarily mean diplomatic effort will be a closed door. It should, instead, activate another round of diplomatic dialogue to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table.

See above.

A little out of order:

Iranian citizens should not bear the brunt of the sanctions and normal business exchanges with other nations should not get affected either.

This statement reflects the desires of the Chinese government to ensure the “mostly” free flow of petroleum stuffs out of and in to Iran; evidenced by the lack of sanctions on the petroleum industry.  The timing is precious if you agree with the view that stiff sanctions that affected the daily lives of Iranians with regards to the petroleum industry would be attributed to the current hard-line regime, which would strengthen the reformist “green” movement.  Chinese officials receive boatloads (teehee) of oil from Iran and are not interested in sacrificing their driving energy demands on the Green Movement.  Further, this conforms to the non-interventionist image crafted by the Chinese foreign policy officials.

Last part:

China is always committed to a dual track approach in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. While insisting that any UN resolution should contribute to the international non-proliferation regime, it has repeatedly stressed that the action be conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East and that it guarantees Iran’s right for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

What does “peace and stability” mean in this context?

Read on…

All these principles have guided China’s participation in the consultations on imposing sanctions against Iran. China hopes Iran would take concrete steps to convince the international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the issue of Israel’s nuclear capabilities was brought up for the first time in 19 years at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, which began in Vienna on Monday.  The highlighting of this issue could be yet another important step in the region’s de-nuclearization process.

There we have it.  Stability is brought into context within the regional consideration of the Iran/Israel divide.  What we can see from this is a major strategic coup for the Iranian-Chinese relationship.  China ultimately can sympathize with the Iranian desire for regional-power status.  By mentioning Israeli nuclear armament the argument goes like this: how is Iran supposed to act when Israel operates outside the very system that Iran adheres to so poorly; at least we aren’t cowering behind the hegemon.  Further, China has tied the stability portion of the argument to a balancing concept: if Israel has them then Iran naturally desires a deterrent.  What is difficult is that it places the issue of Israeli disarmament as the quid pro quo for Iranian disarmament.

Many whom I have spoken with regarding this issue agree about the relative hypocrisy of Israeli nukes, but if the US has trouble getting Israel to lift a little sea embargo just imagine the difficulty in getting them to give up their nukes or join the NPT.

I composed this to respond to Abu’s question:

Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies? If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear? What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations? And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in Central Asia – and how do you propose to secure them?

My response:

The war in Afghanistan is necessary to destroy the remaining al Qaeda targets in the FATA region of Pakistan.  This was the main purpose for invading Afghanistan and should remain our first priority.  By engaging the Taliban elements, who support al Qaeda, we apply pressure to the movement that continues in its desire to spread its vision of an Islamist society.  Our current strategic thinking is that the presence of the Taliban in any region outside the FATA is unacceptable to the security of the US because of their connection to al Qaeda.  If the US can make modest gains in stabilizing a systematic governing cycle of loose federalism in Afghanistan and pacifying support for the Taliban in the population then succeeding in our goal of denying a safe haven to terrorists improves dramatically.

But is all this really necessary?  What if we negotiated the surrendering of al Qaeda leadership with the Taliban?

This should take us back to the immediate post 9-11 months when we could have offered a little more to the Taliban than the choice of open and humiliating capitulation or complete destruction.  During this time we viewed the Taliban as brutal oppressors that stood against all our Western ideals.  To the US the Taliban established exactly the kind of society bin Laden sought to establish, and delivering freedom seemed like a glorious two-for-one.

Now, that we are faced with the price tag of this freedom nine years later the taste in our mouths is becoming unpalatable.  It seems that we now face more problems in Afghanistan than we did during October 2001.  The survival of bin Laden and Zawahiri, a flourishing drug trade, Taliban clashes with the Pakistani government, and the poor performance of centralized leadership in Kabul are all now our problems.  The strategic logic of our current COIN policy says that we must keep pushing deeper into the society in order to stabilize so that we can turn control over to trusted Afghan allies that will preserve the status quo we establish.

This is so because we believe that any incarnation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is simply not an option.  If this is the ultimate goal then the US must be ready for at least a fifteen year military commitment and hundreds of billions of dollars in aid over the next twenty five.  I place such high numbers because I see true political change as the function of generational replacement than, say, purchased inducements.

That being said, I am afraid that Bacevich is right in that there is a cheaper way of accomplishing this; one that does not seek to dramatically alter the political society of Afghanistan.  This requires our purchasing the support of the local leaders and dealing harshly with those who harbor elements of al Qaeda.  The role of the US military in Afghanistan would be one of training and supplying Afghan allies, regulating misfits and disturbances, providing local security for development, reducing the opium trade, and staging for attacks against al Qaeda.

This plan does away with notions of establishing our dreams for a westernized Afghan state by accepting the brutality of the Afghan political culture, accepting the patriarchal nature of Afghan society, and perhaps accepting the reality of the Taliban’s existence as a force with political resonance in Afghan society.  This will require acting with a cold precision about what we must do to achieve denying al Qaeda a foothold in Afghanistan.

Two recent articles by John Bolton and Max Boot have come to the conclusion that now would be the opportune moment for Israel to strike Iranian nuclear sites.  Essentially, Bolton states that Iran is continuing its “delay negotiations to buy time” strategy to develop nuclear weapons capability.  Further, diplomacy is a loser option that will not reverse this inevitability of a nuclear Iran.  Ok, nothing new, but what is disturbing is WHY Bolton thinks this is the best time for Israel, not the US, to strike Iran.

Bolton highlights the recent post-electoral conflicts in Iran, “makes it more likely that an effective public diplomacy campaign could be waged in the country to explain to Iranians that such an attack is directed against the regime, not against the Iranian people.”

This seems like typical Bush-era logic of the “greet us as liberators” simplicity that must be too good to be true.  How would such a campaign work?  How long would it take?  The logic is painfully light on the lynchpin of the argument: that public diplomacy would alter perceptions of Iranians to see the favorability in Jewish planes bombing their nation with near impunity.

Exactly how would this come about?  Such a campaign, which would have the people being bombed identifying and supporting those doing the bombing, is the stuff of dreams.

If John Bolton to going to make the argument that (1) the militarization of the Iranian nuclear program is simply not tolerable.  (2) That the only feasible way to prevent this is by military strike.  And (3) that the overwhelming US power makes any confrontation heavily balanced to the US’s favor.  That is a position you can get behind.  But to suggest that we can prod Israel into doing our dirty work, and then have a majority of Iranians thank us has Bolton bordering on the megalomaniacal.

Again, this is not to say that the position of military solutions to difficult foreign policy options is not valid, but that delusions of its effect on the target nation is a familiar failure for the senior members of the Bush era that has not lost its appeal.

Esteemed Harvard historian Niall Ferguson recently penned an article titled “The Axis of Upheaval” that points to the potential burgeoning hot-spots for international conflict that will face President Obama. On this list is Russia, Somalia, Mexico, Iran, Lebanon, Israel/Gaza, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India with contenders Indonesia, Turkey and Thailand as well as about 60% of sub-Sahara Africa.

Certainly an impressive list to be sure. Ferguson sees this time as especially ignitable due to the recent economic downturn that will cause further disruptions to these fledgling middle world economies. With this downturn will follow domestic political upheavals along with the potential in a few cases for inter-state war as well.  The case for this seems plausible due the globalized nature of interconnectedness for larger international conflicts that develop from state collapse.

The last severe structural economic shock with such a political dimension on the global level was perhaps the Oil Shock of 1973. The following years saw the start of several conflicts that would continue to tragic proportions: Angolan Civil War, Ethiopian Civil War, and the Lebanese Civil War. Further, nations severely hit by the crisis and subsequent downturn faced pivotal changes that continue to have international implications. Iran and Pakistan fit these categories.

But which of these nations would pose the biggest threat to the US if the political systems of these nations fall into violent and disruptive patterns. Though this is purely hypothetical, the list is compiled to reflect the possibility of direct US involvement.

1. Pakistan collapse, Indian invasion. This seems to me to be the most possible of these, and the most potentially disrupting to world order. Not only are the nuclear weapons and large populations the fodder for this scenario, but also the presence of Russia, China, and the US in the region place the conflict at a geopolitical center of potential major power disruptions.
2. Mexican collapse, US response. If Mexico falls into complete disarray then be prepared for a swift response from US officials to preserve order. The potential for millions of refugees flooding into the southwest states makes its case for number two simply in its proximity to the US. Apart from the conservative nightmare this would impart on poor Pat Buchanan, the US would face serious challenges mitigating a failed Mexican state.
3. Afghan collapse. This unpleasant possibility would severely damage the US world standing and reflect its impotence to bend the will of foreign peoples. Also, the process of this collapse would drag on for endless years, with the potential for a two-generation war. Such an occurrence would be devastating to the US.
4. Iran goes nuclear, shuns US pressure. While this is an unpleasant possibility it is by no means the outright disaster. This defeat is more psychological for the US than a real geopolitical disasters of the previously mentioned. In practical terms, the US capability and lack of reliable allies for Iran may provide enough of a deterrent to keep Iran in check for many decades to come. The wild card in all of this is the Israeli reaction.
5. Russia and the next eventual clash with the former soviet bloc. While the expansionist goals of our old Cold War buddy are never far away from the policy makers who cut their teeth in the previous generations, a serious victory for Russia in these areas could range from mild (Georgia or Moldova) to down right alarming (Belarus or Ukraine). Though the zero-sum reasoning of the Cold War might be over the limits of tolerating Russian aggression have not seen the boldest of responses from the US leaders.
6. Israel/Gaza and Hezbollah create regional disharmony. The continual flares of the conflict in Israel remain the most likely of these to flare, but I am not convinced that the implications of this are not that great on a macro scale. It seems that the major danger comes with the injection of further regional meddling, most likely from Syria, but for the time being it appears the region will continue along its familiar path. Though the conflict is the cause of much disharmony during the frequent spats, that is usually all they lead too; contained little outrages that repeal meaningful international action better than piracy. Which leads me too…
7. Somalia falling further. Perhaps it is just me, but this issue deserves to be at the bottom of the list. The media attention this story has garnered is impressive, but I am tired already of the “shores of Tripoli” references for action that the US will not commit to because the problem is relatively small potatoes. Also, lets temper the terrorist label for these high sea entrepreneurs before the facts are in; it seems more likely that these are criminal profiteers in it for the potential for easy money and not al Qaeda 3.0.

It has been a busy few months since i last picked up the keyboard, and (true to form) i return with for an analysis of the upcoming ‘Obama Doctrine’ for Afghanistan.

Somewhat leaked by Reuters this week was an article that highlights the recent shift in the US strategy towards Afghanistan.  Overall, the big picture for the conception of this strategy is based on the concept of “narrowing.”  There is a marked deviation from the rhetorical and ideological foundation of the Bush Administration vision for Iraq, Afghanistan and the essential assumptions about foreign policy.  What may be said in general is that the new strategy will “lower expectations” to the unattainable goals of the heavily rhetorisized Bush policy.  Lofty notions of setting people free all over the world through the power of democracy sounds nice, but the realization of such a goal in eight short years, by force if necessary, is practically unreasonable.

So it is thus that the president will provide some “reality” to the situation and intends to talk soberly about what is available to accomplish in Afghanistan.  By the end we may find that the Afghanistan we leave behind will simply be “free enough.”

Apart from the philosophical goals of this problem Obama has placed specific emphasis on preventing terrorist organizations from operating efficiently from Afghanistan or Pakistan.  To accomplish this Obama is recommitting America to developing the economy of Afghanistan through a localized strategy to improve human security.  Not only increasing the troop levels (a step already taken in February this year), but also training more indigenous capability to share the load.  With all of this in place it appears that Obama has decided to make Afghanistan his priority in his first term.  It is an ambitious challenge for the politician often chided during the campaign as naive and inexperienced, we should all hope then, that he is a fast learner.

I will be posting on all relevant details as the new strategy is revealed over the next week…i promise.

On his first day of office President Barack Obama signed the order to close Guantanamo Bay “no later than a year from today.” Further, President Obama signed orders ending the interrogation policies of the Bush Administration, closing of the CIA secret prison system and requiring a review of all cases of the prisoners of Guantanamo.

The president cited the belief he had expressed on the campaign trail that the betrayal of our democratic principles will make the US less-safe in the long term. Opponents of this view call the president naive.

This “conservative” objection is most often expressed through the extremist voices of the right wing radio (RWR) propaganda machine. When faced with a question regarding Guantanamo the host will often slip into a diatribe condemning Bush for not expanding the system and furthering the distance between what is for “Americans” and what is for “terrorists.”

The rest of America (I believe) realize that the issues involved with keeping and disposing of the Guantanamo system are of no small importance. Regardless, the decision has been made to destroy the system; the question must be returned to what are we to create to replace it.

Just make it up as we go along…

Recent criticisms of President Obama’s decision have focused on his lack of a coherent plan to replace the prison, establish a system of courts to prosecute, or indicate the procedures for interrogation of new prisoners during the Obama administration. “It’s like he is going to make it all up as he goes along; I ask, is that responsible? Will this make us safer?” This lament of a “conservative” host was used to damn the recent decisions of the 44^th president, but it could equally be used to damn his predecessor.

Such short memories fail to grasp the absolute reversal from contemporary American policy towards terrorism that the Bush Administration enacted after 9/11 (chronicled here). The coming to light of just how the Bush Administration dealt with the legal ramifications (here) of the new way that the GWOT entailed designing unilateral policies that struggled against the international nature of the 21^st century; in a new age, they were establishing older sovereignty based arguments.

What is this all really about?

As far as I can tell this is the case for a Guantanamo system:

- the GWOT is a new kind of war

- the members of terrorist organizations are not traditional soldiers and are not subject to established treaties for prosecuting them as civilians or soldiers.

- because of this new “third way” the prisoners are not subject to American justice.

- the terrorists are judged to be guilty without the need of a trail

- anyone deemed in this category do not deserve the benefits of American Justice.

- American security is paramount, and trumps all considerations beyond this immediate calculation.

The other side

- the GWOT is a fabrication, the world is essentially the same

- it was wrong to deviate so drastically from the established manner for bringing terrorists to justice.

- international prisoners should be held to international standards of justice

- trails should be established in the tradition of the rule of law, and have a multilateral dimension.

- judging terrorists without the benefits of the American system taints any concept of “justice”

- American security is best served by leading the world through our integrity abroad by not failing victim to the desire to create an “us vs. them” concept of justice.

- that some immediate risks to our security is worth our national integrity remaining intact.

It’s about damn time…

President Obama made good on a promise to end the unilateral desecration of the American standing of the world because he understands that perhaps our greatest asset in the world is our being that “shining city on a hill.” But how could we become this if we condone torture, operate as if we have no stake in the international arena, and betray our own political freedoms for those around the world. How could we look to the rest of the world and demand that we have the right to unilaterally undertake any action and then not uphold our conduct to the measure of our own citizenry?

The new security is one where we, as Americans, realize that we are not alone in this desire for freedom and extend this luxury as our olive branch to the world. If our hand is bitten in the process then we know for sure who our enemies are, rather than treating everyone as such based solely on our prerogatives.

As the final days of the Bush Administration come to a close any responsible blogger of politics must lend their voice to the litany of of report cards and assessments of a controversial president. Each section will highlight the views of two broad groups of ideological currents of thinking on American politics, followed by a comment about why ultimate judgment remains difficult. I, your humble narrator, am not perfectly immune to my own judgments about these policies, but I will try to elaborate the complexity of the issues that faced our 43^rd leader of the executive branch.

9-11

It is my view that this president was completely entranced by this national tragedy for the majority of his presidency. So deep was his belief that his god had placed him here to face this challenge that his hubris was navigated and manipulated by the black and white view of the world on a micro and macro scale. The challenge thrust upon Bush by a small group of revolutionaries in Afghanistan was pursued with such passion that a broader view of the worlds problems were neglected. The majority of Americans were just as spellbound, and continue to be so, by the audacious actions of al Qaeda, and therefore share in this specific delusion that, “there was a before 9-11, and then there is an after 9-11.”

The Global War on Terror (GWOT)

The necessity to combat this perception of international politics led the US to declare a policy so broad in its scope and so vague in its definition of victory as to be totally malleable to the machinations of political necessity as Bush saw fit. Anywhere, at any time the GWOT could be held as justification for all acts and policies initiated as necessary for the protection of the homeland.

Specifically, the beginnings of the GWOT is the invasion of Afghanistan. Remarkable for its early successes that developed into the further failures of:

-Guantanamo Bay

-neglect of Afghanistan as Iraq came to the forefront

-failure to control opium production

-failure to capture bin Laden

Indeed, as Iraq would prove later the Bush Administration excelled at invading and defeating enemies militarily, but lacked the ability to efficiently secure political and social successes. Those that favor the Presidency of G. W. Bush applaud his record of no other attacks on the homeland as the crowning achievement of the GWOT. This fact leads to one of the most challenging facets of the GWOT.

Taking the Fight to Them

Though the US homeland remained attack free since 9-11, the rest of the world has not been so alleviated from terrorism. By all accounts the period of time during the GWOT has seen record numbers of terrorist attacks throughout the world. A majority of these being concentrated in Iraq, and throughout the Muslim world.

The paradox is thus: has our supposed safety come at the cost of those around the world? The notion of relocating the battlefield of terrorism from the homeland to the countries of our direct involvement has not exactly improved the ultimate security goal of the GWOT for the global picture. The logic seems to suggest that it is better for al Qaeda to attack our troops and societies abroad as a strategic necessity for our safety at home. The cynicism of this policy is not easy to accept, but ultimately it is indeed better for others to suffer for our benefit. Are we as Americans comfortable saying that the 90,000 Iraqis killed since the invasion is acceptable for our safety?

This is not to say that G. W. Bush has blood on his hands, but his policies did lead to these paradoxical outcomes.

Shortly after part I was published a story circulated about President Elect Obama’s stance on Guantanamo and torture.  When asked if voters could find successes in the first two years he responded,

“On foreign policy, have we closed down Guantanamo in a responsible way, put a clear end to torture and restored a balance between the demands of our security and our constitution?”

Further, in true political fashion Obama sought a “deadline” for the destruction of the Guantanamo system.  This lofty goal would signal an end to the “War on Terror” as we have come to realize its ever present existence.  The desire for the closure of Guantanamo will require facing difficult decisions about how to further combat the threat of transnational terror organizations in a matter that obliges is executors to the US constitution.  The essential issue is tied to the understanding of rights, and how these are upheld in an increasingly international world.  To be sure, this is no easy task; as the closure of Guantanamo requires a restructuring of the legal and operational precedents of the Bush Administration.

You can’t ignore the past…

It appeared that the Bush Administration seemed perfectly willing to forgo any meaningful decision about what to do with the regular detainee in Guantanamo.  Sensing that the checks and balance system of the US would take years to reach any meaningful decision about the legality of these “enemy combatants” the Bush Administration sought to continue defending its position on the legal stance of the Administration.  It was the Justice Department that lost its Supreme Court decision in the summer of 2008 requiring the detainees receive the rights accorded to all people incarcerated by the government.  The ruling only stated that the current system of holding prisoners is unconstitutional; it said nothing about how to deal with the prisoners.  In the past months the Administration has cleared around 60 inmates of Guantanamo for release; through what process in a legal sense it is unknown.  As it turns out this course of action is proving difficult when trying to to figure where these five dozen former “enemy combatants” should live.

Will no one take our dirty laundry?

Recently, Australia rejected a request to accept a detainee from Guantanamo.  The US is now faced with the dilemma of being legally bound from releasing the detainees to nations who will prosecute or possibly torture the former inmates.  Recent Bush Administration requests for other European nations to accept released detainees have fallen flat, but with the incoming Obama some Europeans nations are reconsidering.  Though no official positions have been made it should prove interesting to see which leaders are willing to work with Obama on an issue that was rejected under Bush.

A recent VOA article By Al Pessin finds that there are three types of detainees: those who are cleared for release, but no one will take them, those charged with specific crimes, and those who are considered too dangerous to release, but who are incapable of being prosecuted.  This last category reflects the specific manner that the US instituted after 9/11 to handle the “war on terror.”

The traditional approach to terrorism in the legal stance was to treat the cases as criminal acts which must be brought to justice.  The first WTC, Oklahoma City, and USS Cole bombings were all handled in this manner.  Yet, after 9/11 Bush decided that conventional justice would not be enough, and Americans filled with righteous vengeance bought this position without question.  In this climate the Bush Administration displayed its common error in the lack of long term thinking by failing to figure out a process to prosecute those al Qaeda suspects across the world.  Seeking flexibility and typical unilateral control Bush chose the legal no-mans-land of the Guantanamo system for imprisoning all suspects.  Now, seven years later, the mechanisms of the American system have forced the issue of finally figuring out what to do with some 250 men you can neither just kill nor release.

A new kind of court.

Because of the actions in the post 9/11 cleanup of Afghanistan the Bush Administration clearly rejected the conventional approach of bringing to trail these men under the normal means of American Justice.  Today, these cases would not proceed beyond the basic legal parameters of our understanding of justice.  What is now being suggested is a new “National Security Court” that would exist beyond even the shakiest of fast-moving military tribunals conducted in a normal war time setting.  Writing for Slate.com Jack Goldsmith and Benjamin Wittes suggest that these courts could form a basis for a continuing separate sphere of justice that would handle civilian terrorist cases.  With this I foresee two major problems: first, are the standards for burden of proof specifically based on the methods of past detainee arrests, and second, who will be classified under this system?

There is a severe disconnect in basing a legal system on the Bush Administrations past detention policies because there was no serious effort in justifying detention beyond national security.  What Obama faces is the prospect of either having to create two separate courts for the pre and post Bush years, or establishing a court so lax in its burden of proof that it loses public confidence.  All of this must also be established and justified under our constitution.  Next will be to determine who exactly fits into this new system of justice.  Such a decision may further alienate US policy as continued unilateral justice in the American sense spreads international.

Obama has yet to signal what legal sense the Guantanamo issue will be solved.  In choosing, he will perhaps establish a new international system of American Justice; an issue that his predecessor failed to resolve.

It may appear premature to bring this subject up in only part two of the study, but it must be clear what exactly are the intentions of our actions for Afghanistan in a global strategy.  To be clear, what does “victory” look like in Afghanistan?  Ideally, the complete destruction of al-Qaeda through its support system, the Taliban.  The terrorist group formed the basis for the US invasion of Afghanistan; had the Taliban surrendered to US pressure and allowed the capture of Bin Laden we could have left the Taliban alone.  However, since the invasion has occurred the US now faces the reality of how Afghanistan and the War on Terror has progressed.  One of the lessons of 9/11 is supposed to be that the US can no longer afford to isolate nations and allow the lawlessness that permits our enemies to operate effectively.  The complications of the war in Iraq and the power gained by Taliban forces in Pakistan has developed into a geopolitical storm looming on the horizon with Afghanistan signaling the wind change.  In the course of finding what victory means in Afghanistan we shall have to examine several perspectives on how that victory is to be achieved.

How do we win?

During the campaign Obama emphasized the conflict in Afghanistan as being overlooked due to the situation in Iraq.  Further, he expressed that invading Iraq was based on a poor conception of how the War on Terror should be fought.  Yet, what Obama is faced with is essentially a nation-building situation in Afghanistan with similar parallels to the Iraqi situation (complex ethnic divisions, an intrusive and penetrating enemy to the east).  While there are broader similarities between Iraq and Afghanistan the internal dynamics and specific elements of the political equation are much different.  The incoming Obama Administration must come to terms with deciding upon what victory means in the war in Afghanistan because this will directly influence the way in which that victory is achieved.

Let’s get philosophical…

There appears to be two conceptions for the way to win in Afghanistan.  The first looks at the conflict as a battle between competing conceptions of freedom; in essence, a cultural battle of belief systems where victory means the assimilation of the Afghan people into the modern Western-style international structure.  The Taliban represent the antithesis of the liberal (philosophical, not leftist) conception of political existence, whose presence undermines the legitimacy of the US efforts to establish democracy in Afghanistan.  In this understanding victory requires the transformation of Afghan society into a replica of a western state where the people accept the legitimacy of the western model of freedom and dry up the support for the Islamic theocratic interpretation along the Taliban model.  This represents the ultimate in the “hearts and minds” or “soft power” victory for the US; the long term solution for stability that defeats al-Qaeda is the construction of a new and liberal Afghanistan.

Opposing this liberal paradigm is a view that stresses the military angle of the conflict, and rejects the notion that victory must be achieved through societal change.  Rather, we should engage the Afghan society along its own cultural terms and reject the notion that victory ultimately lies in our ability to win the people over to a western style of governance.  For this view, Michael Scheuer holds as a focused proponent.  We may label this as a “tribal” strategy because the focus is on perceiving the US strategy as a competitor in the domestic struggle for Afghan power.  Winning in Afghanistan requires the local leaders and communities identifying their long term interests with those of the US effort in removing the Taliban.  Accomplishing this requires a long term commitment in both the size and scope of military operations and the integration of the power of the US and Afghan forces.  Each victory by these forces increases the power and prestige of the US cause and emphasizes the perception that the right decision is for domestic leaders to side with the most powerful.  Thus, victory is the long term destruction of the Taliban’s base of support through a systematic socio-militaristic strategy where the US succeeds by empowering anti-Taliban leaders.

What we leave behind…

These two conceptions of victory for Afghanistan reflect two distinct conceptions of what we should be achieving, and what kind of Afghanistan we will eventually leave.  In the liberal view the US will seek to create a western style of society that will lead and influence the War on Terror as a cultural model of freedom for the other nations facing Islamic Extremism.  In the “tribal” model the US will leave behind an Afghanistan that resembles the historical traditions of the society that will stand as an example of US determination to defeat Islamic extremism.

It remains to be seen which side of this broad paradigm President Obama has decided upon.  The challenges facing the US in Afghanistan are great, but in determining what policy to implement in Afghanistan it is prudent to ask what kind of an Afghanistan will we end up creating.