The True Narcissists

The world of diplomatic language is a nuanced and specific world, where word choice is paramount and reasoning is open-ended and flexible.  This makes reading such documents of slipperiness as frustrating as grasping for handfuls of air.  To help clarify this murky world I present this continuing segment of “Decoded”

Article here.

It begins:

Fresh sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council against Iran on Wednesday should actually be viewed as another chance for further diplomatic effort to break the nuclear impasse through peaceful solutions acceptable to all parties.

The Chinese leadership publicly believes this.  For the Iranian diplomatic response we can summarize the basic reactions as “rubbish,” a promise for “a reevaluation of the relationship to the IAEA,” the sanctions are “political, illogical, and illegal.”  Basic Iranian reactions from the belligerence we’ve come to adore in the Ahmadinejad regime.  Still, it is not unfeasible for Iran, or any state for that matter, to say one thing and act differently.  In the end this seems to be simply moving along the slow detachment of Iran from international oversight.

Next:

The current UN resolution reflects the concerns of the international community over Iran’s purpose in developing its nuclear program. It aims to push Tehran to undertake active measures that will fulfill its obligations regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The talk of Iran leaving the NPT is always in the air, but without provocation it seems unlikely in the short-term.

Moving on:

However, sanctions can never fundamentally solve the international standoff over the nuclear issue. The sanctions do not necessarily mean diplomatic effort will be a closed door. It should, instead, activate another round of diplomatic dialogue to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table.

See above.

A little out of order:

Iranian citizens should not bear the brunt of the sanctions and normal business exchanges with other nations should not get affected either.

This statement reflects the desires of the Chinese government to ensure the “mostly” free flow of petroleum stuffs out of and in to Iran; evidenced by the lack of sanctions on the petroleum industry.  The timing is precious if you agree with the view that stiff sanctions that affected the daily lives of Iranians with regards to the petroleum industry would be attributed to the current hard-line regime, which would strengthen the reformist “green” movement.  Chinese officials receive boatloads (teehee) of oil from Iran and are not interested in sacrificing their driving energy demands on the Green Movement.  Further, this conforms to the non-interventionist image crafted by the Chinese foreign policy officials.

Last part:

China is always committed to a dual track approach in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. While insisting that any UN resolution should contribute to the international non-proliferation regime, it has repeatedly stressed that the action be conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East and that it guarantees Iran’s right for peaceful use of nuclear energy.

What does “peace and stability” mean in this context?

Read on…

All these principles have guided China’s participation in the consultations on imposing sanctions against Iran. China hopes Iran would take concrete steps to convince the international community about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the issue of Israel’s nuclear capabilities was brought up for the first time in 19 years at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, which began in Vienna on Monday.  The highlighting of this issue could be yet another important step in the region’s de-nuclearization process.

There we have it.  Stability is brought into context within the regional consideration of the Iran/Israel divide.  What we can see from this is a major strategic coup for the Iranian-Chinese relationship.  China ultimately can sympathize with the Iranian desire for regional-power status.  By mentioning Israeli nuclear armament the argument goes like this: how is Iran supposed to act when Israel operates outside the very system that Iran adheres to so poorly; at least we aren’t cowering behind the hegemon.  Further, China has tied the stability portion of the argument to a balancing concept: if Israel has them then Iran naturally desires a deterrent.  What is difficult is that it places the issue of Israeli disarmament as the quid pro quo for Iranian disarmament.

Many whom I have spoken with regarding this issue agree about the relative hypocrisy of Israeli nukes, but if the US has trouble getting Israel to lift a little sea embargo just imagine the difficulty in getting them to give up their nukes or join the NPT.

Two recent articles by John Bolton and Max Boot have come to the conclusion that now would be the opportune moment for Israel to strike Iranian nuclear sites.  Essentially, Bolton states that Iran is continuing its “delay negotiations to buy time” strategy to develop nuclear weapons capability.  Further, diplomacy is a loser option that will not reverse this inevitability of a nuclear Iran.  Ok, nothing new, but what is disturbing is WHY Bolton thinks this is the best time for Israel, not the US, to strike Iran.

Bolton highlights the recent post-electoral conflicts in Iran, “makes it more likely that an effective public diplomacy campaign could be waged in the country to explain to Iranians that such an attack is directed against the regime, not against the Iranian people.”

This seems like typical Bush-era logic of the “greet us as liberators” simplicity that must be too good to be true.  How would such a campaign work?  How long would it take?  The logic is painfully light on the lynchpin of the argument: that public diplomacy would alter perceptions of Iranians to see the favorability in Jewish planes bombing their nation with near impunity.

Exactly how would this come about?  Such a campaign, which would have the people being bombed identifying and supporting those doing the bombing, is the stuff of dreams.

If John Bolton to going to make the argument that (1) the militarization of the Iranian nuclear program is simply not tolerable.  (2) That the only feasible way to prevent this is by military strike.  And (3) that the overwhelming US power makes any confrontation heavily balanced to the US’s favor.  That is a position you can get behind.  But to suggest that we can prod Israel into doing our dirty work, and then have a majority of Iranians thank us has Bolton bordering on the megalomaniacal.

Again, this is not to say that the position of military solutions to difficult foreign policy options is not valid, but that delusions of its effect on the target nation is a familiar failure for the senior members of the Bush era that has not lost its appeal.