It may appear premature to bring this subject up in only part two of the study, but it must be clear what exactly are the intentions of our actions for Afghanistan in a global strategy. To be clear, what does “victory” look like in Afghanistan? Ideally, the complete destruction of al-Qaeda through its support system, the Taliban. The terrorist group formed the basis for the US invasion of Afghanistan; had the Taliban surrendered to US pressure and allowed the capture of Bin Laden we could have left the Taliban alone. However, since the invasion has occurred the US now faces the reality of how Afghanistan and the War on Terror has progressed. One of the lessons of 9/11 is supposed to be that the US can no longer afford to isolate nations and allow the lawlessness that permits our enemies to operate effectively. The complications of the war in Iraq and the power gained by Taliban forces in Pakistan has developed into a geopolitical storm looming on the horizon with Afghanistan signaling the wind change. In the course of finding what victory means in Afghanistan we shall have to examine several perspectives on how that victory is to be achieved.
How do we win?
During the campaign Obama emphasized the conflict in Afghanistan as being overlooked due to the situation in Iraq. Further, he expressed that invading Iraq was based on a poor conception of how the War on Terror should be fought. Yet, what Obama is faced with is essentially a nation-building situation in Afghanistan with similar parallels to the Iraqi situation (complex ethnic divisions, an intrusive and penetrating enemy to the east). While there are broader similarities between Iraq and Afghanistan the internal dynamics and specific elements of the political equation are much different. The incoming Obama Administration must come to terms with deciding upon what victory means in the war in Afghanistan because this will directly influence the way in which that victory is achieved.
Let’s get philosophical…
There appears to be two conceptions for the way to win in Afghanistan. The first looks at the conflict as a battle between competing conceptions of freedom; in essence, a cultural battle of belief systems where victory means the assimilation of the Afghan people into the modern Western-style international structure. The Taliban represent the antithesis of the liberal (philosophical, not leftist) conception of political existence, whose presence undermines the legitimacy of the US efforts to establish democracy in Afghanistan. In this understanding victory requires the transformation of Afghan society into a replica of a western state where the people accept the legitimacy of the western model of freedom and dry up the support for the Islamic theocratic interpretation along the Taliban model. This represents the ultimate in the “hearts and minds” or “soft power” victory for the US; the long term solution for stability that defeats al-Qaeda is the construction of a new and liberal Afghanistan.
Opposing this liberal paradigm is a view that stresses the military angle of the conflict, and rejects the notion that victory must be achieved through societal change. Rather, we should engage the Afghan society along its own cultural terms and reject the notion that victory ultimately lies in our ability to win the people over to a western style of governance. For this view, Michael Scheuer holds as a focused proponent. We may label this as a “tribal” strategy because the focus is on perceiving the US strategy as a competitor in the domestic struggle for Afghan power. Winning in Afghanistan requires the local leaders and communities identifying their long term interests with those of the US effort in removing the Taliban. Accomplishing this requires a long term commitment in both the size and scope of military operations and the integration of the power of the US and Afghan forces. Each victory by these forces increases the power and prestige of the US cause and emphasizes the perception that the right decision is for domestic leaders to side with the most powerful. Thus, victory is the long term destruction of the Taliban’s base of support through a systematic socio-militaristic strategy where the US succeeds by empowering anti-Taliban leaders.
What we leave behind…
These two conceptions of victory for Afghanistan reflect two distinct conceptions of what we should be achieving, and what kind of Afghanistan we will eventually leave. In the liberal view the US will seek to create a western style of society that will lead and influence the War on Terror as a cultural model of freedom for the other nations facing Islamic Extremism. In the “tribal” model the US will leave behind an Afghanistan that resembles the historical traditions of the society that will stand as an example of US determination to defeat Islamic extremism.
It remains to be seen which side of this broad paradigm President Obama has decided upon. The challenges facing the US in Afghanistan are great, but in determining what policy to implement in Afghanistan it is prudent to ask what kind of an Afghanistan will we end up creating.